UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-6-2016

State v. Ambriz Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 44007

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Ambriz Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 44007" (2016). Not Reported. 3191.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3191

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
NO. 44007
)
v.
)
CASSIA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-2064
)
MARTIN GUZMAN AMBRIZ,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)
________________________

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CASSIA
________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. CRABTREE
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Interim State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #6555
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9525
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................1
Nature of the Case .....................................................................................1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ...............................................................................1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .......................................................................4
ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................5
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ambriz’s
Motion To Suppress .........................................................................................5
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................8
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .................................................................................9

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
State v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 552 (Ct. App. 2000) .......................................................... 6
State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255 (2000)............................................................................... 7
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661 (Ct. App. 1991)............................................................... 5
State v. Morris, 159 Idaho 651 (Ct. App. 2015) ........................................................... 5, 6
State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10 (Ct. App. 1994) ....................................................... 7, 8
Statutes
Idaho Code § 49-630................................................................................................... 6, 7
Idaho Code § 49-637................................................................................................... 6, 7

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his opening brief, Martin Ambriz argued the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the officers who stopped his vehicle lacked reasonable
suspicion to believe he was driving under the influence or had committed a traffic
offense. In its brief, the State misstates the testimony regarding Mr. Ambriz’s driving
and argues, for the first time, that Mr. Ambriz committed two traffic violations. The
record reflects that Mr. Ambriz’s driving was well within the broad range of what can be
described as normal, and the State did not argue or prove in the district court that he
committed a traffic violation. The officers who stopped Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle did not
have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Ambriz included a statement of the facts and course of proceedings in his
opening brief, which he incorporates herein by reference.

(App. Br., pp.1-4.)

He

includes this section here only to respond to the State’s description of his driving. The
State asserts in its brief that when Mr. Ambriz turned from Hillcrest onto East 16th
Street, “both of his passenger side tires went off the roadway and onto the gravel on the
side of the road.” (Resp. Br., p.1.) The State asserts “Deputy Zalewski testified that
when [Mr.] Ambriz’s vehicle made a right turn, both of his right tires fully went off the
roadway and onto the gravel.” (Resp. Br., p.1.) The State later asserts “[t]he deputies
observed both of [Mr.] Ambriz’s passenger side tires completely leave the roadway.”
(Resp. Br., p.5.) These statements are not accurate.
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Deputy Zalewski never testified that both of Mr. Ambriz’s passenger side tires
went off the roadway into the gravel when he turned onto East 16th Street. She testified
on direct examination as follows:
Q:

And did you observe anything happen when [the vehicle] made that
turn?

A:

When it made that turn, it actually hit the gravel on the right-hand
side of the road and then it came back onto the roadway.

Q:

And when that happened, you say it hit the gravel. How far off the
road would that be in an estimation?

A:

I would say its full right tire went into the gravel.

Q:

So its full right tire went off of the road and in the gravel?

A:

That is correct.

(9/28/15 Tr., p.7, L.15 – p.8, L.2.) Deputy Zalewski was asked on cross-examination,
“And that was just one tire that went on to the gravel?” She answered, “Well, it was
both sides of the passenger side tire.” (9/28/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.8-11.) This testimony
could be interpreted to mean either that both sides of Mr. Ambriz’s passenger front tire
went into the gravel, or that both Mr. Ambriz’s passenger front tire and his passenger
rear tire went into the gravel.
Deputy Reusze did not state whether she saw one or both of Mr. Ambriz’s
passenger side tires drive into the gravel. She testified that she saw Mr. Ambriz’s
vehicle “drive off the road into the gravel to the right side.” (9/28/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.16-23.)
She was not asked to clarify this testimony on either direct or cross-examination.
In its order denying Mr. Ambriz’s motion to suppress, the district court stated
“[b]oth deputies testified that they saw the Defendant’s vehicle go off the roadway with
at least the passenger-side tires in the gravel on the side of the road.” (R., p.92.) This
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is not an accurate characterization of the officers’ testimony. It would be accurate to
say that the officers testified they saw Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle go off the roadway with at
least the front passenger-side tire in the gravel. This is significant, of course, because
this is the one portion of the encounter that was not captured on the dash-cam video
recording, and the portion of the encounter that was captured on the video recording of
the stop was rather minimal—specifically, the in-lane “jerking motion.” (See R., p.94;
9/28/15 Tr., p.8. Ls.3-8.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ambriz’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ambriz’s Motion To Suppress
The officers who stopped Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle testified they did so because first,
when executing a right turn onto an unlined and unmarked highway, (at least) the right
front tire of Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle entered the gravel on the side of the road; and second,
after properly signaling and executing a second right turn approximately one minute
later, Mr. Ambriz made quick, jerky movements within his lane of travel. Relying partly
on State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661 (Ct. App. 1991), Mr. Ambriz argued in his opening
brief that this driving pattern did not provide the officers with reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity because it could just as easily be explained by conduct falling within the
broad range of normal driving behavior. The State attempts to distinguish Emory and
argues, for the first time on appeal, that Mr. Ambriz’s driving onto the gravel on the side
of the road (but not his in-lane movements) constituted a traffic violation. The State’s
arguments are unavailing and should be rejected by this Court. The conduct observed
by the officers did not provide them with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Mr. Ambriz does not contend that Emory created a “normal driving behavior”
exception to traffic laws. (See Resp. Br., p.7.) Instead, he contends that, like in Emory,
the driving pattern observed by the officers here could just as easily be explained by
conduct falling within the broad range of normal driving behavior. See Emory, 119
Idaho at 662. The State contends this case is more analogous to State v. Morris, 159
Idaho 651 (Ct. App. 2015), but Morris is distinguishable.
In Morris, an officer witnessed the defendant’s vehicle’s tires cross the solid white
line for two to three seconds, and the district court determined this constituted a
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violation of either Idaho Code § 49-630 or § 49-637. 159 Idaho at 655. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the denial of Mr. Morris’s motion to suppress, concluding the conduct
observed by the officer constituted a violation of § 49-637(1).

Id. at 656.

Having

determined he committed a traffic violation, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument
under Emory that his driving fell within the normal range of driving behavior. Id. The
Court explained “the patrol officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in that he
had witnessed Morris commit a traffic violation.” Id.
Here, unlike in Morris, the State did not argue in the district court that Mr. Ambriz
committed a traffic violation, and the district court made no findings with respect to the
same. Now, for the first time on appeal, the State argues that Mr. Ambriz committed a
traffic violation when he “[drove] on the gravel outside the roadway.” (Resp. Br., p.9.)
The State should not be allowed to raise this argument for this first time on appeal and,
in any event, the record does not establish that Mr. Ambriz committed a traffic violation.
The State first argues Mr. Ambriz violated Idaho Code § 49-630(1).

(Resp.

Br., p.9.) Idaho Code § 49-630(1) states that with certain exceptions not relevant here,
“[u]pon all highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the
roadway….” As an initial matter, the State did prove in the district court that East 16th
Street, which is a two-lane road without any line or lane markings, is of sufficient width
to accommodate two vehicles driving fully in the roadway. (See Def. Ex. A, ATT0015,
00:00-00:25.) Moreover, the State did not argue, and the district court did not find, that
a violation of § 49-630(1) can exist in the absence of any line or lane markings. In
State v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 552 (Ct. App. 2000), the defendant argued the officer’s
observation of him driving over the fog line could not establish reasonable suspicion of a
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traffic violation because the fog line was obscured by snow. Id. at 554. The Court of
Appeals rejected this argument, stating “snow cover on the fog line would not inevitably
excuse such a violation when the visibility of the line separating traffic lanes permitted
drivers to ascertain the location of the roadway as the [officer] was able to do.” Id. at
554-55.

In this case, there was no line demarcating the road and the gravel and,

further, no line separating the two traffic lanes. The State does not cite any cases
finding a violation of Idaho Code § 49-630(1) on a two-lane highway of unknown width
that does not have lane or line markings.
The State next argues that Mr. Ambriz violated Idaho Code § 49-637(1). (Resp.
Br., p.10.)

This statute, titled “[d]riving on highways laned for traffic,” provides for

certain rules “[w]henever any highway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly
marked lanes for traffic . . . .” As discussed above, East 16th Street does not contain
any lane markings.

(See Def. Ex. A, ATT0015, 00:00-00:25.)

Thus, Mr. Ambriz’s

driving on East 16th Street could not have violated § 49-637.
What we are left with, then, is the officers’ observation of Mr. Ambriz driving
briefly onto the gravel on the right side of East 16 th Street, and Mr. Ambriz’s in-lane
“jerky motions.” (9/28/15 Tr., p.31, Ls.14-18; p.35, Ls.10-14.) This is the type of driving
behavior that cannot support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The State contends that in-lane jerking movements can contribute to a finding of
reasonable suspicion, relying on State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10 (Ct. App. 1994),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 258-60 (2000). (Resp.
Br., pp.8-9.) But Naccarato is distinguishable. In Naccarato, the officer who stopped
the defendant’s vehicle testified at the suppression hearing “that he had pursued the
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vehicle . . . in order to investigate a citizen’s report of a drunk driver.” Id. at 12. He
followed the defendant’s vehicle and observed it “continuously weaving” within its lane,
traveling fifteen miles under the posted speed limit.

Id.

The Court of Appeals

considered the totality of the circumstances, and agreed there was “reasonable,
articulable suspicion for the officer to make an investigative stop.” Id.
Considering the totality of the circumstances here, the officers lacked reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity when they stopped Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle. There had been
no report of a drunk driver and no obvious violation of the myriad of traffic and
equipment laws. The stop of Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his opening brief,
Mr. Ambriz respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 6th day of October, 2016.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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